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Abstract  
 
 The primary aim of this paper is to explore the effectiveness of Hoarding International 
Reserves and Sterilization in dollarized and indebted countries such as Turkey and Lebanon, 
by measuring the sterilization coefficient, and the offset coefficient. It also focuses on 
exploring the link between the sources of Reserves and the external debt. Using monthly data 
collected from the International Monetary Fund and from the Central Banks of Turkey and 
Lebanon between January 1994 and February 2011, we applied a 2SLS regression models and 
we identified explanatory variables that enabled us to estimate the aforementioned 
coefficients. Our results showed that despite their theoretical practice of sterilization policy, 
economic constrains of these countries contribute to weaken the efficacy expected from 
monetary policies. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Monetary policy, International Reserve, Sterilization, Foreign Liabilities, 
Dollarized countries, Turkey, Lebanon.  
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1. Introduction 
Hoarding of international reserves (IR) is often conceived as exclusive to the emerging 
market countries (EMC). They share around 65% of global reserves in 2008.  In 2010, six 
Asian countries
1
 were among the world‟s largest holder of IR. This increasing trend became 
remarkable in the post-crisis era in Eastern Asia and Latin America (Figure 1). The basic 
source of the IR growth is the persistent current account surplus.  The first mainly reason for 
the course of hoarding IR, as described by Aizenman and Marion (2004), Calvo (2006), 
Aizenman et Lee (2008, 2010) and Aizenman et al (2011), is that it offers a precautionary 
self-insurance against financial crisis
2
. In fact, those countries have suffered from sudden stop 
crisis that caused a psychological impact
3
 in the region, and so made EMC look for a build up 
ample war chest of IR to protect themselves eventually against a new same type of crisis. The 
second mainly reason of hoarding IR is that it occurs a mercantilist export promotion. This 
means that buying foreign currencies permit to hold down domestic currencies and therefore 
improve external competitiveness and promote exports. Finally, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) 
explain that growth of IR offer exchange rate stability after systematic foreign market 
interventions.   
The process of hoarding IR is followed by a policy called sterilization. When a Central Bank 
(CB) decides to buy IR, it will either add to the fund by increasing the Reserve of Monetary 
Base (MB) also known as Reserve Money (RM), which is potentially inflationary, or reduces 
its Net Domestic Assets (NDA), which sterilize/neutralize the impact on Reserve of MB
4
. 
Countries that hoard IR also sterilize them; this trend became apparent in the 90s (figure 2). 
Therefore hoarding IR and Sterilization consist of complementary policies. The success of 
hording IR was so remarkable in the recent years that accumulation of IR became more 
desirable. Thus, countries post crisis which were previously expressing the “fear of floating” 
described by Calvo and Reinhart, (2002), are nowadays expressing the “fear of loosing 
International Reserves” as mention by Aizenman and Lee (2010).  
However, the efficiency of these policies is not automatically guaranteed. First, the 
implementation of the monetary policy should be compatible and match with the internal 
                                                        
1 China, India, Taipei, Korea, Singapore and Hong-Kong. 
2 According to these authors, International reserves are considered as buffer stock, which allows greater flexibility of 
exchange rates and provides domestic authority with access to hard currency to cover basic living expenses and mitigate to 
adverse consequences of capital flight. 
3 Expression used by Aizenman et al 2011 
4 Indeed, the Central Bank can bring out the effect of hoarding on the monetary base in several ways, including the sale 
market instruments such as government bonds or use the swap or other. 
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economy of the country and respect the context of Mundell Trilemma
5
, called by Obsfeld et al 
(2004) “The guide of the political structure”. In addition to the latter, the financial markets 
must be developed and the instruments used in sterilization should be liquid, otherwise, 
according to Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001), IR and sterilization policies become a sort 
of “International Liquidity Illusion”. Second, as proved in several studies of authors cited 
above, the domestic and foreign bonds should be perfect substitute and the domestic interest 
rate should be less than the international one (otherwise the interest cost of sterilization bond 
becomes unsustainable). Finally, an adequate level of hoarding IR for every country should be 
determined
6. The “Grennspan-Guidotti” Rule7 was considered as the most adherents and 
empirical support, which consists of hoarding IR that exceeds the total short-term external 
debt
8
. Recently, Obsfedl et al (2009) mentioned that despite the focus on the “Guidotti- 
Greenspan” rule and sudden stops in the literature, short term external debt is not a significant 
predictor of reserve holdings, though another variable often considered in more traditional 
models, the Trade/GDP ratio is. Briefly, either the first or the second ratio, the inclusion of 
Trade Balance and external debt should be considered.  
Some countries like Lebanon and Turkey are sharing the same post-crisis EMC behavior: 
increasing the ratio of IR/GDP with sterilization (figure 3 and figure 4). Turkey and Lebanon 
are considered between the highest holder of IR, ranked respectively the 17
th
 and 27
th
 if 
adding Gold
9
. The IR minus gold in GDP ratio in Turkey exceeds the 30%, and about 70% for 
Lebanon. The latter is considered having the 9
th
 highest IR/GDP ratio in the world
10
 
exceeding the ratio in China, Malaysia, Korea, and some other EMC. But Turkey and 
Lebanon internal economic structure are basically different from the EMC; suffering from 
almost the pre-crisis EMC flaws: 1- An important deficit Balance of Payment (Figure 5) 
which deplete the stock of reserves and/or forces monetary authority to borrows reserves. 2- 
A high foreign liabilities (Figure 6) which reduce the efficacy of IR as explained above and 
excessively. 3- A dollarization rate (financial dollarization and/or currency substitution) going 
from about 30% in Turkey to 70% in Lebanon; due to the degree of country trust and 
                                                        
5  Mundell Trilemma explained the impossible to match simultaniously financial integration, and stability of exhange rates 
with a monetary independance. 
6 The ratio IR on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) can only determine a measure of IR accumulation, but this ratio cannot 
express the adequate level of hoarding IR 
7 Former chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Alan Greenspan, and former deputy minister of finance for Argentina, 
Pablo Guidotti, published an academic paper in 1999 that suggested, to avoid a default, a country needs to maintain hard 
currency reserves equal to at least 100% of their short-term (maturing in the next 12 months) foreign debt.  
8 Inn Jeanne and Rancière, 2009 
9 According to the CIA World Factbook, 2011 
10 If we add gold hold by the Central Bank (excluding the part in the IMF and UCB), Lebanon becomes the 3th holder in the 
world on international reserves relatively on his GDP. 
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currency trust.  Thus, the condition of perfect substitutability of domestic bonds and foreign 
bonds is rejected. Eishengreen and Hausman (1999) and several authors later, called the two 
last cases using the term of « Original Sin
11
 », to describe the impossibility for a country to 
borrow abroad in its local currency and its risky consequences.  
Lebanon and Turkey are a sample of countries that are facing a paradox between the buffer 
stock expected by accumulating and sterilizing IR; and the possible vulnerability to crisis 
expected by the Original Sin.  
Most of the previous studies focused on the exchange rate regime and the interest rate (the 
interest rate and its evolution is related to the exchange rate regime) to conclude conditions of 
efficiency of IR and sterilization monetary policy. In this paper, we emphasized on the foreign 
liabilities and the dollarization rate. Using a 2SLS regression model, we estimated, the 
sterilization coefficient of Lebanon and Turkey, which influence sterilization function 
(sterilization coefficient). We also estimated the offset coefficient of the capital flow equation, 
consisting of measuring the fraction of policy-induced change in the bank reserves, which is 
offset through the capital account. We concluded that although monetary policy of 
sterilization seems to be practiced like as seen in the EMC, the offset indicated the 
ineffectiveness of such application. More precisely, the “Original Sin” characteristics affect 
the monetary policy and contribute in the reduction of the effectiveness of the monetary 
policies that are being used. In addition, by decomposing the source of Foreign Reserves 
inflows, we found that monetary authority integrate partially the external debt, which defy the 
basic and theoretical definition of capital inflows of EMC.  
 
                                                        
11 Until 2005 definition of “original sin‟‟ has been modified several times by Eishengreen and Hausmann  with eother authors 
and it now associated to dollarized countries with foreign liabilities. 
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2.THEORITICAL FRAMEWORKS 
The formal empirical investigations and interpretations of the relationship between inflows, 
sterilization and monetary policy efficiency are usually described in the literature by the 
estimation of the sterilization coefficient, and the offset coefficient.  Based on the framework 
of Herring and Marston (1977), Kouri and Porter (1974) and Cumby and Obsfeld (1982), the 
sterilization coefficient consist on estimating the sterilization function; while the offset 
coefficient consist on evaluating the degree of what the central bank‟s activities in the 
domestic market spurred additional capital inflows. 
 
2.1. Sterilization Function 
We Expressed the sterilization function called in several studies “monetary policy reaction 
function”  from changes in NDA held by monetary authorities, and of changes of capital 
inflows NFA coming from abroad:   
∆NDA = α+β∆NFA + δi Xi + εi   (1) 
Where Xi represent other exogenous variables, which can affect the equation of the 
sterilization function.  Xi variables reflect the effects of monetary policy. Thus, knowing that 
ß1 is a parameter that determines the decisions of monetary authorities regarding sterilization, 
we deduce that: 
If ß = -1, ΔNFA represents a full sterilization of reserves. The CB grants domestic credits to 
facilitate the increase of money demand (due to GDP growth) but prevents the expansion of 
domestic credit from NFR. This means that every unit of foreign exchange purchased by the 
CB (the increase of NFA) through its intervention in the foreign exchange market which 
should creates RM, will be neutralized; and thus, the created money will be withdrawn 
(decrease of NDA) from the market, and consequently, the change in RM will be equal to 
zero. If ß = 0, there is no practice of sterilization. In other words, every net inflow or net 
outflow of foreign capital will result in an equal change in the domestic money supply. If -1 
<ß <0, there is a partial sterilization.  If ß <-1, this indicates a tighter monetary policy due to a 
greater interest about inflation. In this case, possession of a unit of foreign reserves will 
reduce domestic assets held by the CB of more than one unit and therefore reduce the MB. If 
ß> 0, we are in an economy of expansionary monetary policy because of concerns about 
"credit crunch" or exposure to a systemic crisis. 
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2.2. Capital-flow Equation  
We studied another aspect of the interdependence of capital inflows and monetary measures 
called the capital-flow equation. We estimated the impact of the Change in Net Domestic 
Asset (ΔNDA) on Changes in Net Foreign Asset (ΔNFA): offset coefficient. The offset 
coefficient indicates the fraction of any domestic credit expansion reserved by the CB foreign 
reserve losses in the same period and the sterilization coefficient indicates the degree of 
sterilization which is offset in the inflows so as to leave the overall money supply unaffected 
through open market operations or some other monetary regulations like reserve 
requirements. The NFA becomes the dependent, which represent the ΔNFA in the CB‟s NFA 
as a proxy for capital inflows, while the main explanatory variable is ΔNDA, reflecting the 
effects of monetary policy. Other exogenous variables can affect capital inflows are 
represented by vector Zi in the equation:  ΔNFA=β‘∆NDA+δ’iZi.+ εi  . 
Where β„ is the offset coefficient and its value ranges between “-1” and  “0”.  If β‟ is around 
zero, there is no capital mobility. The change in ΔNDA affects the overall money supply, 
which means that the impact of activities undertaken by the CB partially or fully “remains” in 
the system. If β‟ = -1 there is a perfect capital mobility, in other words, every reduction in 
NDA is compensated by an equal increase in NFA, while the supply of money in the system 
remains unchanged and vice versa; thus, sterilization becomes ineffective, as described by 
Christensen (2004). 
2.3. Sources of Foreign Reserves 
Theoretically, inflows coming from abroad are from Current account (CA) and capital 
account (K).   Therefore, ∆NDA = α (CA + K) + δi Xi + εi                 (2) 
Considering that the Balance of Payment (BP) is the sum of CA balance and K balance (CA + 
K) and it is equal to the change in the central bank‟s NFA, which is approximated by the 
change in Foreign Reserve. The function (2) becomes written like function (1). Based on the 
study of Aizenman and Glick
12
 (2008), we estimated the essential sources of NFA, by 
expressing the change in the NDA using the fallowing equation:  
ΔNDA= α1 + β CA+ δ1 Kal+ δi Xi + εi 
Contrary to EMCA such as China, Singapore, Brazil, Malaysia and others that have excess in 
their commercial balance, Lebanon and Turkey are characterized by a BP deficit; Aizenman 
and Glick (2008) divided the NFA into CA, and K. As for Lebanon and Turkey, we 
                                                        
12 In their work, Aizenman and Glick (2008) they even divided K into Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Non Foreign 
Direct Investment (NFDI). 
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considered in this paper external debt to investigate sources of NFA, specifically that those 
variables seem to follow the same trend (Figure 3). 
 
3. ESTIMATION OF STERILIZATION AND OFFSET COEFFICIENT 
 
3.1. Data Description 
All data used to estimate econometrically the ΔNDA (sterilization coefficient) and the ΔNFA 
(offset coefficient), in addition to all variables, are given monthly, from January 1994 to 
February 2011
13
.  Our data was collected from IMF-IFS
14
 and from the Central Bank of each 
country and were seasonally adjusted. GDP was expressed by coincident indicator. Turkey 
and Lebanon data were respectively expressed in million local currencies and in billion local 
currencies
15
, by converting monthly data on dollar-denominated into local currency terms 
using the average local currency price of the dollar for each month. We divided our study 
about Turkey into two periods: 1994-2000 and 2001-2010 separated by the financial crisis, in 
order to distinguished different trends of monetary aggregates and macreconomic variables, as 
represented by figures in the appendix. The NDA was defined by subtracting the NFA from 
the RM. Thus, a positive value of NFA corresponds to foreign inflows and a negative value of 
NDA indicates that the monetary authorities reduced their domestic assets held. The NFA was 
adjusted by taking the dollar denomination level of the FR and then adjusted them for the 
exchange rate changes; to give a valuation adjusted measure of changes in NFA in domestic 
currency.  The formula of adjustment of the NFA is:   
ΔNFAAadjusted = (FXt) * (NFA
16
 t - NFAt-1) - (FLt – FLt-1), where ∆ is the change operator. FX 
is the average of monthly exchange rate of the local currency against the US Dollar and the 
FL
17
 is the Financial Liabilities of the Central Bank.  
In the reaction function equation, the variables percentage change in GDP is always taken. 
Indeed, a simple version of the monetary approach to BP supposes that the increasing of NDA 
with the GDP growth rate, could meet growth in demand for money without resorting 
hoarding FR.  The new in our study is that we took into consideration the effect of foreign 
liabilities (public debt expressed in foreign currencies) as an exogenous variable. In other 
                                                        
13 For some economists like Christensen, 2004, using quarterly data would hide a lot of information on monthly movements 
because monetary policy reacts to fluctuations of the variables almost on a daily basis (exchange rate, liquidity movement 
etc..) and the market quickly respond to monetary policy measures. 
14 International Monetary Fund- International Financial Statistics 
15 Turkish lira TKL is the local currency for Turkey, and Lebanese pound LBP is the local currency for Lebanon. 
16 The NFA correspond to the IMF line 11D  
17 Correspond to the IMF Line 16c 
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words, we will study the impact of the dependence of countries to foreign currencies due to 
debts and to local market demands, on the monetary policy decision and reaction. The Money 
Multiplier (MM) permits to explain how the policy action influences the money stock. Ever 
since the MM has been developed by Brunner (1961) and Brunner and Meltzer (1964)
18
, it 
has been used in empirical analyses of money stock control and the impact of monetary policy 
actions on other economic variables. The MM is calculated by dividing the total M2 to RM. 
This variable argues that the control of money supplies relies on the authorities being able to 
control the monetary base. It is considered in several studies as an indicator that has a great 
impact on creating or withdrawing RM. In a case of a high de facto
19
 dollarized economy 
such Turkey and Lebanon where:  1- the saving account in Commercial Bank and credit are 
expressed in foreign currency more that in local currency
20
 “financial dollarization”,   
2- where foreign currency in circulation also know as currency in hand are used as a medium 
of exchange “substitute money”  in addition to 3- the  price of goods and service and/or salary 
in foreign currency “real dollarization”; the definition of Broad Money should be modified 
and corrected by the Effective Broad Money (Feige, 2003). Therefore, in our calculation, we 
considered first the Broad Money (MM); and then we used the Effective Broad Money 
(MMY), which consists of including the Foreign Currency in Circulation
21
 to see if there is 
any difference in results. The Interest rate “ITR” is used in our function as an exogenous 
variable to measure the difference between the deposit interest rate (6 month) on foreign 
currency and the deposit interest rate (6 month) on local currency. This variable has been 
chosen as a regulated instrument because of its important role in dollarized countries where 
US Dollar demand is high the domestic ITR should be more attractive than the external one; 
therefore the domestic ITR is strictly constrained by authorities to compete US Dollar ITR. 
The variation of gross external debt is added as exogenous variable. In fact, as described by 
the “snowball effect”, the higher the interest rate (domestic) is, the more the charges for 
government will be heavy therefore, debt will increase to finance old debt with high interest 
rate if GDP is not sufficient and lower than the reel interest rate.  Thus, if the CB stays away 
from money creation or is not allowed to create money, in order to avoid eventual high 
inflation, its last resort will be to increase the foreign debt.  
                                                        
18 In the official site of the central Bank of Turkey :  http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/yeni/eng/ 
19 The de jure or official dollarization economy consist of leaving completely the domestic currency and 
replacing it by a foreign currency. 
20 The ratio foreign currency deposit / total deposit > 30% 
21 In the sum of M2, we should ad the M2Y witch takes into consideration all foreign currency deposit (including accounts) 
of residents (real sector entities). 
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Variables used in the capital-flow functions to interpret the offset coefficient are known as 
control variables because of their role of motivating the capital inflow to the country.  
Montiel and Reinhart (1999)
22
 described the capital-flow function and called control variables 
incorporating as push versus pull
23
. Referring to his studies, we included as exogenous 
variables, the percentage change in GDP because, theoretically, the GDP growth influences 
on money. We also included the MM and MMY (Broad Money, and Effective Broad Money 
in two steps as explained above) because we considered that facing excessive monetary 
expansion will push down the interest rate and the CB will respond by using the foreign 
exchange market (i.e change in the NFA) while at the same time changing the monetary 
policy instruments (i.e changing in NDA). In this paper, we emphasized on the debts in 
general as a control variable, and external foreign debt particularly. The debt and more 
precisely, the foreign liabilities were included in our capital flow function, because: Firstly, 
increasing in debt may spur additional capital inflows directly (in the foreign market) and 
indirectly (if the government is financed by domestic banks that raise the necessary funds 
aboard). Secondly, the BP deficit of Lebanon and Turkey may results in a contraction of bank 
reserves by an identical amount. We used to add the percentage change of the local currency 
against the US dollar (FX) because FX reflects the central bank‟s exchange rate policy, 
especially in a country where the CB relies on foreign exchange intervention to maintain the 
exchange rate stability.  In fact, a volatility of exchange rate may increase investment risk and 
uncertainty for foreign investors, hence diminishing the extent of capital inflows. 
 Based on the explanation above (part 2-3) consisting on decomposing the NFA, in addition to 
the Current account and the capital account, we included the external debt for two reasons: 
First, because the BP of representative countries is deficit, and literature talk about borrowing 
external debt as the only alternative for accumulating NFA. Second, because the trends of 
hoarding foreign reserves and the foreign liabilities seems to be similar (Figure 3 and Figure 
4). In Lebanon, the important positive ΔNFA (in 1995, 20001, 2002, and 2008) corresponds 
to the dates of new engagement in foreign currencies. In Turkey too, the high positive ΔNFA 
corresponds to new engagement of external debt (66 Billion US Dollar in 1996 and 100 
billion US dollar in 1999). In addition, since the Transition of the String Economy Program 
TSEP supported by the IMF and the World Bank in 2001 consisting of reducing the ratio of 
domestic debt/GDP and external debt/GDP, we can see that ΔGED has decreased.  
                                                        
22 Inn Ouyang and Rajan, 2005 
23 It consists in general of seven variables:  1- the M2, 2- the inflation, 3- the exchange rate, 4- the high lagged real output, 5- 
the high government expenditure, 6- the high exchange rate adjusted in the interest rate and 7-the high volatility of exchange 
rate. 
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3.2. MODEL  
We implemented the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test to check for unit roots, and we found 
that all variables used are stationary (Table 1). 
Variables studied express the percentage change from log-first difference except for the ITR 
witch measure only the change. NDA and NFA are divided on RM lagged on the year before, 
because changes in the RM usually lead to increase or decrease in money credit that are larger 
than the changes in the RM
24
 
 
 a- The Sterilization Function:  
∆NDAt/RM-1=α+β∆NFAt/RM-1+γ∆lnGDPt+δ∆lnMMYt+λ∆ITRt+Φ∆lnGEDt+ εi 
∆NDAt/ RM-1=α+β∆NFAt/RM-1+γ∆lnGDPt+δ∆lnMMt+ εi   (basic model) 
The coefficient β is the sterilization coefficient. 
b- The Capital-Flow Equation:  
∆NFAt/RM-1=α’+β’∆NDAt/RM4+γ’∆lnGDPt+δ’∆lnMMYt+λ’∆lnGEDt + ∆lnFXt+  ε’i 
∆NFAt/RM-1=α’+β’∆NDAt/RM4+γ’∆lnGDPt+δ’∆lnMMt+ε’i  (basic model) 
The coefficient β‟ is the offset coefficient. 
Variables are expressed in log-first difference form and are used in Two Stage Least-Square 
(2LSLS) method. It is important to note that an endogeneity problem of the NFA variable in 
the sterilization function and of the NDA variable in the capital flow equation can bias all 
results
25
. Therefore, the Hausman endogeneity test has been carried out in order to check this 
problem of endogeneity. The endogeneity test of the table 2, which consists of adding the 
residual value of the sterilization function (capital flow equation) to the Capital flow function 
(sterilization function), indicated that the OLS was not consistent for Turkey due to the 
significant coefficient of the residual. Thus the 2SL2 method should be used.  Although the 
Hausman test doesn‟t indicates the inconsistency of the OLS for Lebanon equations, due to 
theoretical implications and being in line with Obsfeld (1982), we would apply the 2SLS 
method for the estimation of equations for both countries. 
The theory does not precisely say which instrument should be used in the models analyzed 
here, but econometrically, the instrument should be correlated with explanatory endogenous 
                                                        
24 As seen in Aizenman and Glick (2008), and in Cavoli and Rajan (2005), Micossi and Rinaldi (1988). NDA and NFA were 
scaled by RM from the previous period in order to exclude the increase in their nominal variance series over time. 
25 In fact, Ouyang, Rajan and Willet 2007 works on seeking to control for the possible endogeneity of the explanatory 
variables on sterilization regressions through instrument estimation, and they didn‟t find much effect on coefficient 
magnitudes and their standard errors, as compared to OLS. Inn Aizenman et al 2008. 
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variable and uncorrelated with the residuals from estimated model. The change on the 
exchange rate of the local currency against the US dollar was chosen as the instrumental 
variable in the sterilization function because, economically, the exchange rate is the nominal 
anchor of monetary policy in Turkey and the Central Bank maintains the stability of the 
exchange rate almost entirely through foreign exchange interventions, which will have impact 
on the change in the foreign exchange reserve of the central bank. Therefore, in the economic 
point of view, the change of FX is correlated with the movement of the NFA variable. 
As for the second equation, the change in the change in the Inflation rate INF was used as 
instrumental variable because; higher inflation could perpetuate concerns about exchange rate 
depreciation and interest rate hikes and capital losses, thereof, hence causing a reduction in 
capital inflows. Thus, NFA movement could be closely linked with the movement of NDA 
movement. Conditions of instrumental variables were accepted for Turkey.  
As for Lebanon, due to its DE FACTO exchange rate regime since 1998, the choice of 
instrumental variables will vary. Based on the “Mundell trilemma” (inconsistent trinity), 
Desquibet (2007) explained that in Lebanon, the conventional fixed peg to a single currency 
imposes constraints to the monetary authority.  In fact, when there is liberalization of capital, 
yields of different capital markets are determined by the markets forces and interest rate is 
realized selon conditions of non covered rate. Therefore, CB gives priority to the external 
stabilization (exchange rate, balance of payment) instead of the internal stabilization 
(domestic interest rate and domestic inflation), but as mentioned earlier, the variation of 
domestic interest rate should follow the modification of the US one.  
Therefore, in an economic point of view, FX and CPI cannot be considered as instrumental 
variable in the equations as it is in the case of Turkey, and economitrically conditions required 
were not verified too. In contrast (other than the econometric reasons not correlating with the 
residual and correlating with the explanatory endogenious variable), we chose the variation of 
credit in foreign currency from Commercial Bank as instrumental variables for Lebanon. In 
fact, the deposit in foreign currency which is higher than the deposit in local currency (due to 
several reasons of dollarization cited above) is granted as credit to Lebanese agents. Knowing 
that Lebanese interest rate in US dollar is less than in Lebanese one, and that now salaries are 
more and more dispensed in local currency; these two latters increase the liquidity risk and 
solvability risk. 
In order to avoid banking risk, CB intervene to limit credit in foreign currency to 70% of total 
foreign deposit, and encourage the deposit in domestic currency with the “ Deposit 
Certificate” which consist of borrowing in foreign currency but reimbursing them in local 
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currency.  Therefore, the CB limits the credit in foreign currency with its intervention to the 
market and thus resulting in:  
First, a direct impact in the change on the NFA in commercial bank, and so on in the CB: 
(instrumental variable in the first equation). 
Second, interventions from CB in order to limit bank‟s lending to the private sector as well as 
to modify financing of the government.  Since the NDA variable is as such to outline all 
changes in monetary policy instruments, NDA could be closely linked with the movement of 
credit bank:  (instrumental variable in the second equation). 
 
 It should be noted that the equations have been tested for the presence of heterodasticity, 
using the white test, and for autocorrelation, using the Lagrange Multiplier test.  In the 
equations that indicate the presence of heterodasticity and serial correlation of residuals 
26
 
variances have been corrected by using the method cohran-Orcutt (ar(1) or ar(2)) and Newey-
West correction method. 
 
c-The Source of Foreign Reserve 
Considering that the ΔNFA is equal to the variation of the BP account, therefore, the NFA can 
be divided into CA and K and scaled in lagged RM as following:  
ΔNDA/RM-1 = α + β1 CA/RM-1 + δ1 K/RM-1 + θi ∆lnGDPi  + εi.  
The monthly data on dollar-denominated BP flows are converted into local currency terms 
using the average local currency price of the dollar for each month.  We applied this equation 
for Turkey. However, in the case of Lebanon, due to a lack in the data concerning the CA and 
K, we only used the variation of Trade Balance (TB) scaled on lagged RM of the year before. 
As seen in Aizenman and Glick (2008), the source of the FR is from the higher significant 
coefficient (β1or δ1). In this article, we included the variation on gross external debt scaled by 
the lagged RM for the reasons explained above. Thus equations for Turkey and for Lebanon 
become:  
ΔNDA/RM-1 = α + β ΔCA/RM-1 + λ1 ΔK/RM-1 + δi ΔGED/RM-1  + θi ∆lnGDPi + εi 
ΔNDA/RM-1 = α + β ΔTB/RM-1  + δi ΔGED/RM-1 + θi ∆lnGDPi +  εi 
 
 
                                                        
26 all equation in table 3 and 4, and equation 1 in table 5 and 6 
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4. RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION 
4.1. Estimation of the Sterilization Coefficient 
The “basic model” in table 3 and 4, shows the results of the estimated sterilization coefficient 
and the offset coefficient in Turkey and Lebanon. 
Sterilization coefficient in Turkey is -0.98; which means that Turkish Central Bank is doing a 
complete sterilization of capital inflow, and therefore every one unit of foreign exchange 
purchased by the CB is neutralized to reduce at the same amount the domestic assets, thus the 
reserve money becomes unchanged. 
The offset coefficient in Turkey is -0,93. It is little lower than the sterilization coefficient, this 
result indicates that the CB‟s sterilization policy, (which is reflected in the reduction of NFA 
and withdrawal of RM through the reserve requirement instrument or open market operation), 
led only partially to additional capital inflows and ultimately to the increase in the central 
bank‟s NFA.  The lower value of the offset coefficient compared to the sterilization 
coefficient indicates a certain degree of independence of monetary policy in neutralizing 
capital inflows.  
As mentioned earlier, if the offset coefficient is -1, this means that the sterilization‟s policy is 
totally ineffective. Whereas if the offset coefficient is equal to zero, this means that measures 
undertaken in the domestic market did not result in additional inflows.  
In the case of Lebanon, the sterilization coefficient is equal to -0,795; which means that the 
Lebanese Central Bank does a partial sterilization of capital inflow, and therefore 79% of 
NFA are being used by the CB to reduce NDA.  
The offset coefficient is equal to -0.864 and is little bit higher than sterilization one. This is 
the worst case of offset, when it exceeds the sterilization coefficient.  Knowing that the offset 
coefficient indicates the amount of the capital outflow per domestic currency of expansion of 
domestic credit, we deduce that the domestic and the foreign assets are close substitutes:  -
0,864 indicate a high degree of capital mobility and low degree of control over the money 
stock. 
 It is interesting to analyze the fact that the offset coefficient was higher than the sterilization 
coefficient. This means that with a low degree of control, the government is financing the 
trade balance deficit and the budget deficit by external foreign inflow (by borrowing). It was 
the case of Mexico in the 90s, where the Mexican government intervened in the economy by 
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increasing external debt to finance current account and budget deficit. In fact, our period of 
studying (1994-2011) consist of a period of  reconstruction of the Lebanese economy and  an 
increase of the external debt going from 10% to more than 50% of total debt, and in absolute 
value, it was 5 times more (fgure 6). And every new engagemen (in 1995, 20001, 2002, and 
2008) is followed by an increase in the ΔNFA. 
The GDP growth was positive and statistically significant in Turkey ( not for Lebanon);  a 
stronger economic activity requires a large volume of money and transactions; thus monetary 
expansion.  
MM was statistically significant for both countries as expected. The negative sign indicates 
that the higher MM is, the more the CB will reduce its NDA so that to respect the counter 
inflationary objective of monetary policy. 
 In order to study the case of Turkey and Lebanon, taking into consideration their particular 
characteristics of high dollarization rate and external debt, we estimated the sterilization and 
offset coefficient in the equation 1 and 2 described in tables 5 and 6.  For Turkey, the study 
was divided into two periods:  before and after the crisis from 1994 to 2000 and from 2001 to 
2011 so results can reflects more precisions. 
 Starting with the equation 1 of tables 5 and 6, the sterilization coefficient for Turkey was 
-1, 01 and -1.06 in the two periods. As explained above, Turkey is practicing a fully 
sterilization of Foreign Reserves.  Lebanon too is almost practicing a fully sterilization with 
its coefficient equal to -0.96. 
As for exogenous variables, we found that MMY (M2 including foreign currencies) was 
statistically significant in both countries and the coefficient became higher (the coefficient of 
MMY exceeds -1, while it was around -0,7 and -0,8). Thus the important impact of 
dollarization rate on the monetary reaction functions.   
Although the alomot same sterilization coefficient in Turkey during two periods, the MM 
decrease from -1.3 to -1.03. CB of Turkey may express more stability after the crisis and 
becomes less concerned about inflationary objective, or more stable. 
The ITR was statistically significant for Lebanon  and for Tyrkey (period before 2001) and 
the negative sign indicates that the higher difference between deposit domestic interest rate 
and deposit foreign interest rate, which induce higher capital inflows, require stronger 
sterilization in the sense of reducing the central bank‟s NDA. It is not for Turkey for Turkey 
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after crisis. In fact, as showed in figure7, the interest rate was very high, which reflects an 
important impact on the monetary policy, until 2001. In the second period, the interest rate 
was almost stable and varied in the same trend with external interest rate, which indicates less 
and less important impact of interest rate on the NDA of CB, resulting with more stable 
situation in comparison with previous period. 
The GED was statistically significant in both countries and has a positive sign. In fact, the 
higher the deficit of BP is, the higher will be the external debt covering it, and so neutralizing 
the increasing of NFA by reducing the NDA. For Turkey, after 2001, the coefficient of GED 
decreased from 0.309 to 0.136. As cited before, this is the result of TSEP supported by the 
IMF and the World Bank in 2001 consisting of reducing the ratio of domestic debt/GDP and 
external debt/GDP of Turkey.   
The variation of GDP is statistically significant and positive in Lebanon and Turkey. 
Knowing that the sterilization coefficient is near to “-1”, this indicates that the CB supplies 
liquidity to the economy by increasing its claims in response to greater economy activity.  
 Concerning the result of the Capital flow function (Equation2) in tables 5 and 6, we found  
that both, Turkey before crises and Lebanon have a high offset coefficient, almost equal to 
sterilization coefficient, resulting in less effective sterilization policy.  Especially in Lebanon 
where the offset sterilization is very close to the sterilization coefficient, resulting in a very 
bad application of this monetary policy.What it remarkable is the sterilization coefficient of 
Turkey in the second, which decrease to -0.875 this indicates a better sterilization monetary 
policy. MMY is statistically significant in both countries with negative sign, which means that 
a rise of MMY might increase the domestic money and push the interest rate down, and 
consequently reducing the capital inflow from abroad. In Turkey, MMY and variation of DA 
has same trend, which is logical due to the economic relation between the MMY and the 
domestic Money under constrains of sustainable inflation.  The GDP is statistically significant 
in Lebanon, and in the first period of Turkey, which means that the growth of the domestic 
economy is relatively strong to be accompanied by monetary expansion. FX is significant for 
both countries , and the negative sign indicates that the depreciation (appreciation) of the local 
currency against the US dollar, will force the CB to sell foreign exchange (purchase foreign 
exchange), i.e reduce (increase) its NFA, which means spending its international reserves.   
In turkey, after 2001, the FX coefficient is much less than in the first period going from  
 -1.786 to -0.759 in absolute value. It indicates the less implication of the CB in the foreign 
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market, and the more flexible of exchange rate regime. As showed in figure 8, the exchange 
rate regime in Turkey before 2001 was following a unique trend and increasing due to 
depreciation of its domestic currency, but after 2001, the trend was almost a sowtooth 
reflecting in more liberalization of its foreign market.  In Lebanon, the coefficient of FX is 
relatively extremely high equal to -2.4 which represent the high implication of the monetary 
authority in the Lebanese foreign Market. In fact, despite the De Jure floated exchange rate 
regime, Lebanon‟s exchange rate regime is De Facto pegged to US dollar. And since the thirs 
quarter of 1999, the exchange rate volatility in Lebanon is zero (figure 8). Therefore, the CB 
can‟t tolerate any fluctuation and intervenes severely in the financial market to avoid any 
eventual devaluation, especially that in a highly dollarized country, where local currency is 
untrusted, the minimum fluctuation of the FX will result in panic and sudden stop, and/or 
converting the local currency by foreign currency and thus increasing the probability of 
financial crisis. 
The positive sign of significant GED variables indicates that the monetary policy was 
countercyclical under the condition of growing general government debt. In fact, during the 
period of deficit financed by the government borrowing, the CB was accumulating foreign 
exchange reserves and neutralizing capital inflows by increasing net NFA, which provided 
leeway for reacting under the conditions of slower economic growth and limited inflow of 
capital abroad. The GED coefficient becomes smaller in Turkey in pre-crisis period which 
report the less increase of GED/GDP, as explained above. 
Briefly, our results showed that for Turkey in the pre-crisis period and for Lebanon, every 
“one” unit of foreign reserved sterilized is offset. Sterilization policy becomes totally not 
effective or very weak. But starting from 2001, the sterilization monetary policy becomes 
more effective due to its lower value of the offset sterilization. There is a discrepancy between 
our results about Turkey and those seen in the studies by Altinkemer (1998), Celasun et al 
(1999) and Emir et al (2000), who studied the period prior to 1993. However, our results 
compares well with those found by Emir et al pertaining on the period between 1993 - 2000. 
As for Lebanon, there is no previous detailed study about sterilization monetary policy. 
Nevertheless, in several IMF reports about Lebanon‟s economy, it was mentioned that 
Lebanon should stop/reduce practicing the sterilization; which have substantially weakened 
the CB‟s net income position especially with its unsustainable cost. 
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4.3. Sources of NFA 
Does the sterilization responses to reserve inflows vary according to the source of the inflow? 
Does the extent to which the central bank manages its domestic asset holding depend on 
whether reserve inflows are associated with BP and its components or the external debt? 
These were questions asked by Aizenman and Glick (2008) about Asian and Latin America 
Emerging Countries, and have found that when the capital account was deficit, the inflows 
source was from the current account and vice versa, which is expected. Tables 6 and 7show 
that in Turkey, only CA is statistically significant. This latter indicates that CA is the principal 
source of foreign outflow. In fact, as it was for many EMC countries, not all accounts in the 
BP were necessarily in excess.  As for Lebanon, the TB account was not statistically 
significant. In fact, in figure 5 shows that despite the deficit of BP for both countries, 
Turkey‟s situation is much better that Lebanon‟s, and the deficit is remarkably lower, which 
may explain the non significance of TB.  We should also indicate that replacing CA and K by 
TB in the case of Lebanon weakens the estimation and the conclusion, and can only give a 
general idea about the significance of the TB account. In other words, the more the TP is 
decomposed into several accounts, the more the source of NFA is precise... However, 
variation of the GED/RM-1 was statistically significant for both countries, which confirms the 
close link between the growth external debt and the foreign outflow. The positive sign explain 
the opposite trajectory with the foreign outflow, in another way, when the BP is deficit, 
borrowing foreign increase in order to fill the gap thus the opposite sign of the variable. The 
higher coefficient in the second period in Turkey consist o the increasing of the deficit (figure 
5) in TB, filled by the external debt. We have seen the GED/GDP in Turkey was decreasing, 
thus, sterilization and offset coefficient were smaller. But in this case, the coefficient becomes 
bigger in the period pre-crisis, which reflects the need of GED relatively to the increase of the 
Turkish deficit. 
As seen in tables 6 and 7, Adjusted R-Squared is small especially for Lebanon. The model 
misses many explicative variables, but lead to give only about the impact off the BP on the 
sterilization monetary policy.  
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5. IMPORTANT REMARKS 
1- It should be noted that the sterilization coefficient and the offset coefficient are parameters 
determining only the stance of monetary policy but not the fully understanding of monetary 
policy
27
. If we limited the definition of sterilization‟s efficiency to Disyatat and Galati (2005), 
we would only interpret the efficiency of the foreign exchange interventions (i.e. conversion 
in capital inflows) by using the basic model, which measures the extent to which they have 
been sterilized (i.e. quantifying their impact on RM only). But efficiency of sterilization and 
especially the efficiency of the foreign intervention depend on many other macroeconomic 
and financial variables and market conditions.  
2- IR and Sterilization studies are always completed with the cost of sterilization to estimate 
whether it is successful or not (in term of trade-of between control over bank reserves and 
control over foreign exchange reserves implicit in the choice among sterilization policies) 
and/or whether it is long term or short term sustainable or not. Sterilization cost based on 
interest rate studies will be treated in a paper separately. 
                                                        
27 Requires information about changes in private and public Banks‟s reserve requirement, discount window, etc. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
Our paper investigates the sterilization monetary policy in Turkey and Lebanon, who 
theatrically enjoyed from the application of the sterilization policy, but in return, are suffering 
from economic constrains such deficit in Balance of Payment, high external debt and 
important dollarization rate, which in theory should decrease the efficiency of the sterilization 
monetary policy.. We found that every unit of Net Domestic Asset (NDA) decreased by the 
Central Bank (CB) for Turkey and Lebanon from the sterilization policy is almost replaced by 
additional unit of foreign exchange inflows and contributes to increase or the Net Foreign 
Asset (NFA). This additional unit inflows needs to be sterilized again, which creates a vicious 
circle of rising capital inflows and the need for additional sterilization resulting of less 
effective policy. However, for Turkey, after the financial crisis from 2001, the offset 
coefficient decreased, resulting in a better application of sterilization policy. In addition when 
decomposing the NFR into Balance of Payment accounts in order to measure its impact on the 
variation of NDA, we found a week relation in opposite of previous results, which in theory 
should be similar. However we found a significant positive relation between the gross 
external debt and the decreasing of the NDA, which confirm the “debt divert” to fill the BP 
deficit. We conclude that despite their theoretical practice of sterilization policy in Turkey and 
Lebanon, economic constrains of these countries contribute to weaken the efficacy expected 
from monetary policies.  
 Lebanon and Turkey, which suffered from a high dollarization rate, and a deficit BP, increase 
the IR (Dominguez 2009) by borrowing reserves after being depleted. This will on one side, 
increase the external debt (Obsfend et al 2009), and on the other side, if IR is sterilized, it will 
prompt rises in domestic debt by monetizing it (Calvo 1990). The latter is as serious and as 
dangerous as the external debt (Calvo 2006), it represents the key barriers to economic 
progress and weeakens the central bank role. We conclude that country which basically 
suffers from economic constraints; sterilization of IR becomes a source of macroeconomic 
vulnerability. 
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APPENDIX  
 
Table 1: Dickey Fuller Test  
 
Variables Description of variable TURKEY 
T-Statistic 
LEBANON 
T-Statistic 
ΔNFA/RM-1 (NFAt2- NFA t1)/RM-1 -6,46*** -14,18*** 
ΔNDA/RM-1 (NDA t2-NDA t1)/RM-1 -6,336*** -14,20*** 
ΔlnGDP lnGDP t2- lnGDP t1 -7,695*** -10,82** 
ΔITR (INTfx-INTdom) t2-  (INTfx-INTdom) t1 -8,18*** -9,75*** 
ΔlnMMY lnMMY t2- lnMMY t1 -17,184*** -6,936*** 
ΔlnMM lnMM t2- lnMM t1 -14,08*** -15,008*** 
ΔlnGED lnGED t2- lnGED t1 -10,884* -15,54** 
ΔGED/RM-1 (GED t2- GED t1)/RM-1 -13,83* -21,9*** 
ΔEXPORT/RM-1 (EXPORT t2-EXPORT t1)/RM-1 ------- -21,9*** 
ΔK/ RM-1 (K t2-K t1)/RM-1 -7,25*** ----- 
ΔCA/RM-1 (CAt2- CA t1)/RM-1 -4,28*** ----- 
ΔFX lnFXt2- lnFX t1  -10,606*** -2,92*** 
INF lnCPI t2-ln CPIt1 -14,67*** --------- 
Residual-1 equation 1 -12,03*** -11,26*** 
Residual-2 equation 2 -3,462**** -9,19*** 
Residual-3 equation 3 -5,66*** -7,33*** 
Residual-4 equation 4 -10,85*** -6,98*** 
Residual-5 Equation 5 (source of NFA) -13,31*** -13,86*** 
    
           *Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1% 
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Table 2 
Hausmann Test for endogeneity 
A-Lebanon:  
 
Sterilization coefficient: equation 1 
Dependent Variable: ΔNDA/RM-1 
Method: Least Squares: OLS 
Included observations: 194 after adjustment: 1995M01- 
2011M02 
  
  Variable Coefficient Prob. 
   
   C 0.011120 0.0000 
ΔNFA/RM-1 -0.921339 0.0000 
ΔlnGDP 0.052648 0.0277 
ΔlnMMY -1.162505 0.0000 
ΔITR -0.006426 0.0385 
ΔlnGED 0.043094 0.0117 
Hausman_res -0.045028 0.5032 
  
  R-squared 0.945881 
Adjusted R-squared 0.943822 
  
   
 
Offset coefficient :  equation 2 
Dependent Variable: ΔNFA/RM-1 
Method: Least Squares : OLS 
Included observations: : 192 after adjustment: 1995M03 2011M02 
 
   
   Variable Coefficient Prob. 
   
   C 0.010695 0.0000 
ΔNDA/RM-1 -0.938852 0.0000 
ΔlnGDP 0.046381 0.0376 
ΔlnMMY -1.090796 0.0000 
ΔlnGED 0.056286 0.0032 
ΔlnFX -2.390356 0.0017 
Hausman_res 0.010178 0.8516 
   
   
R-squared 0.927163 
Adjusted R-squared 0.923979 
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B-Turkey 
 
Sterilization coefficient: equation 1 
Dependent Variable: ΔNDA/RM-1   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 204 after adjustments : 1994M01 2010M12  
   
   Variable Coefficient Prob. 
   
   C 0.005279 0.0000 
ΔNFA/RM-1 -1.026897 0.0000 
ΔlnPIB 0.028382 0.8936 
ΔlnMMY -1.093064 0.0000 
ΔlnGED 0.233129 0.4636 
INTERET -0.000792 0.0786 
Hausman_res 0.005755 0.9746 
   
   R-squared 0.980617 
Adjusted R-squared 0.979921 
   
     
 
 
 
Offset coefficient :  equation 2 
Dependent Variable: ΔNFA/RM-1   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 202 after adjustments : 1994M02 2010M11  
 
 
   
   Variable Coefficient Prob. 
   
   C 0.018449 0.0000 
ΔNDA/RM-1 -0.720444 0.0000 
ΔlnPIB 0.546292 0.0009 
ΔlnMMY -1.027265 0.0000 
ΔlnGED 0.339640 0.1581 
ΔlnFX -0.264296 0.2672 
Hausman_res -0.205187 0.0000 
  
  R-squared 0.978302 
Adjusted R-squared 0.977403 
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Table 3 
Basic Evaluation of sterilization monetary policy in Turkey 
 
a- Sterilization coefficient  (equation 1) 
Dependent ariable ΔNDA/RM-1 
Included observations: 205 after adjustments: 1994M02-
2011M02 
 
 
b- Offset Coefficient (equation 2) 
Dependent Variable: ΔNFA/RM-1 
Included observations: 202 after adjustments : 1994M02 2010M11 
  
  Variable Coefficient Prob. 
   
C 0.038295 0.0000 
ΔNDA/RM-1 -0.938178 0.0000 
ΔlnPIB 0.0776766 0.0701 
ΔlnMM -0.877852 0.0000 
  
  R-squared 0.956424  
Adjusted R-squared 0.955539  
   
Lagged dependent variable &  regressors added to instrument list   
 
 
   
   
 
  
  
Variable Coefficient Prob. 
   
C 0.053544 0.0000 
ΔNFA/RM-1 -0.982121 0.0000 
ΔlnPIB  0.105029 0.0818 
ΔlnMM -0.781161 0.0000 
  
R-squared 0.955312 
Adjusted R-squared 0.954418  
  
 
Lagged dependent variable & regressors added to instrument list  
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Table 4 
Basic Evaluation of sterilization monetary policy in Lebanon 
 
a- Sterilization coefficient (equation 1) 
Dependent Variable: ΔNDA/RM-1 
Included observations: 205 after adjustments : 1994M02 2011M02 
   
Variable Coefficient Prob. 
   
C 0.014052 0.0000 
ΔNFA/RM-1 -0.795382 0.0000 
ΔlnGDP 0.064716 0.1201 
ΔlnMM -0.815449 0.0000 
   
R-squared 0.802158  
Adjusted R-squared 0.799205  
   
Lagged dependent variable & regressors added to instrument list  
   
 
 
b- Offsent coefficient (equation 2) 
DependentVariable: ΔNFA/RM-1 
Included observations: 205 after adjustments: 1994M02 2011M02 
   
Variable Coefficient                Prob 
C 
ΔNDA/RM-1 
0.015749 
-0.864253 
0.0001 
0.0000 
ΔlnGDP 0.077433 0.0641 
ΔlnMM -0.685480 0.0004 
R-squared 0.727893 
Adjusted R-squared 0.722451 
   
 Lagged dependent variable & regressors added to instrument list  
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Table 5 
Estimating the efficiency of the sterilization monetary policy in Turkey 
 
  Sterilization coefficient (equation 1) 
 
a-Dependant variable ΔNDA/RM-1 b Dependant variable ΔNDA/RM-1 
Included observations: 83    Included observations: 120 
From 1994M02 to 2000M12  From 2001M01 to  2010M12 
  
 
Offset  coefficient (equation 2) 
 
a-Dependant variable ΔNFA/RM-1  b-Dependant variable ΔNFA/RM-1 
Included observations: 201   Included observations: 119 
From 1994M03 to 2010M11  From 2000M01 to  2010M11 
 
 
 
    
Variable Coefficient 
       
Prob   Variable Coefficient Prob.   
     
     C 0.057269 0.0000  C 0.018876 0.0000 
ΔNDA/RM-1 -0.94126 0.0000  ΔNDA/RM-1 -0.875027 0.0000 
ΔlnPIB 0.864438 0.0648  ΔlnPIB 0.173894 0.3323 
ΔlnMMY -1.178831 0.0000  ΔlnMMY -0.904457 0.0000 
ΔlnGED 2.313815 0.0121  ΔlnGED 0.721615 0.0070 
ΔlnFX -1.786178 0.0000  ΔlnFX -0.759747 0.0001 
 
 
    R-squared  0.954431    R-squared                  0.971101   
Adjusted R-squared     0.953518   Adjusted R-squared   0.970087   
   Lagged dependent variable & regressors added to instrument list 
 
 
 
 
    
Variable Coefficient 
       
Prob   Variable Coefficient Prob.   
     
     C -1.019570 0.0000  C -1.062959 0.0000 
ΔNFA/RM-1 -1.019570 0.0000  ΔNFA/RM-1 -1.069455 0.0000 
ΔlnPIB 0.095623 0.6412  ΔlnPIB -0.104732 0.3284 
ΔlnMMY -1.311931 0.0000  ΔlnMMY -1.033563 0.0000 
ΔlnGED 0.309115 0.0138  ΔlnGED 0.1369933 0.0395 
ΔINT -0.001235 0.0664  ΔINT -0.001273 0.4702 
     R-squared  0.984030    R-squared                  0.985128  
Adjusted R-squared     0.982753   Adjusted R-squared   0.984415   
      Lagged dependent variable & regressors added to instrument list 
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Table 6 
Estimating the efficiency of the sterilization monetary policy in 
Lebanon 
 
a- Sterilization coefficient (equation 1) 
Dependent Variable: ΔNDA/RM-1 
Included observations: 193 after adjustments 
 
 
 
 
b-Offset Coefficient (Equation 2) 
Dependent Variable: ΔNFA/RM-1 
Included observations: 193 after adjustments : 1995M02 2011M02 
 
   
   Variable Coefficient Prob. 
   
   C 0.011289 0.0000 
ΔNDA/RM-1 -0.941206 0.0000 
ΔlnGDP 0.063945 0.0025 
ΔlnMMY -1.109674 0.0000 
ΔlnGED 0.035707 0.0288 
ΔlnFX -2.44217 0.0008 
   
   R-squared 0.940242  
Adjusted R-squared 0.938422  
   
    Lagged dependent variable & regressors added to instrument list 
   
 
 
 
  
C 0.011739 0.0000 
ΔNFA/RM-1 -0.966249 0.0000 
ΔlnGDP 0.050334 0.0339 
ΔlnMMY -1.11 0.0000 
ΔlnGED 0.044470 0.0340 
ΔINT -0.006189 0.0470 
   
R-squared 0.945749  
Adjusted R-squared 0.943989  
   
Lagged dependent variable & regressors added to instrument list  
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 Tables 7 
Sources of Foreign Reserves 
 
a-Turkey 
Dependent Variable: ΔNDA/RM-1 
Method: Least Squares 
 
a-Dependant variable ΔNDA/RM-1  b-Dependant variable ΔNDA/RM-1 
Included observations: 83    Included observations: 120 
From 1994M02 to 2000M12  From 2001M01 to  2010M12 
      
       
Variable Coefficient Prob.  
Variabl
e Coefficient Prob. 
       
       
C 0.028605 0.2269 C 0.002151 0.9926 
ΔlnPIB 1.814493 0.0056 ΔlnPIB 0.824710 0.0526 
ΔCA/RM-1 -0.458583 0.0552 ΔCA/RM-1 -0.186437 0.05232 
ΔK/ RM-1 0.084247 0.2892 ΔK/ RM-1 0.131557 0.1854 
ΔGED/RM-1 0.181869 0.0000 ΔGED/RM-1 0.335801     0.0000  
       
      
R-squared                      0.514334  R-squared                      0.514334 
Adjusted R-squared       0.489744  Adjusted R-squared       0.489744 
     
       
 
b-Lebanon 
Method: Least Squares 
Dependent Variable: ΔNDA/RM-1 
Included observations: 205 after adjustments : 1994M02- 2011M02 
   
   Variable Coefficient Prob. 
   
C -0.26241 0.0787 
ΔlnTB/RM-1 -0.062133 0.0351 
ΔGED/RM-1 0.037102 0.0181 
ΔlnGDP -0.067167 0.4983 NS 
   
   
R-squared 0.174625  
Adjusted R-squared 0.158709  
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APPENDIX 
 
Figure 1- 
Foreign Reserve on GDP 
 
a-World from 1980 to 2006 
 
Source : Aizenman, Chinn, Ito, 2008  
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Figure 2 
 Variation of NDA/RM and NFA/RM 
 
Latin America Countries and East Asia (Source : Aizenman, Chinn, Ito, 2008 ) 
 
 
 
Variation of NDA/RM 
<0 => sterilization 
Variation of 
NFA/RM 
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FIGURE 3  
Foreign Reserve on GDP and External Deb on GDP 
 
Turkey, from 1995 to 2010 
 
 
 
 Lebanon, from 1995 to 2010 
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Figure 4 
Variation of NDA/RM and NFA/RM 
28 
Lebanon : (Source Author’s data) 
 
 
 
Turkey: (Source Author’s data) 
 
 
 
                                                        
28 The blue indicates the ∆NFAt/RM4 and the green indicates the ∆NDAt/RM4 
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Figure 5 
Import and Export from 1995-2010 
 
Lebanon: In Billion Local Currencies 
 
 
 
Turkey In Million Local Currencies 
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Figure 6 
Gross External debt and Net Foreign Asset from 1995-2010 
  
Turkey In Million Local Currencies 
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Lebanon In Billion Local Currencies  
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Figure 7 
Interest rate on deposit (6 months) 
 
a- Turkey 
 
 
Source:  central bank of Turkey : http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/ 
 
 
 
b-Lebanon 
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Figure 8 
Exchange rate 
  
a-Turkey 
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